Piura in the New Andean Chessboard: Security, Elections, and Geopolitics

In recent weeks, Peru has begun to occupy a different place on the strategic map of the United States and the Andean region. This is not the result of a single event, but rather a convergence of signals: FBI and DEA delegations arriving in Lima, a presidential meeting with Ecuador focused on transnational crime, an ongoing presidential and congressional election process, and—according to Bloomberg—the intention of Washington to designate Peru as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

 

Taken separately, these developments might appear circumstantial. Taken together, they point to a shift in phase in the relationship between security, domestic politics, and regional geopolitics. And this shift directly affects territories such as Piura, a strategic region in northern Peru.

 

Piura is located on Peru’s northern Pacific coast, bordering Ecuador by land. It covers approximately 35,900 square kilometers and is home to about two million people, making it one of Peru’s most populous departments. Its geography—combining border crossings, ports, highways, agricultural valleys, and informal trade routes—turns Piura into a key node for both legal commerce and illicit flows.

 

The organized crime affecting Ecuador and increasingly spilling into Peru no longer follows the traditional drug-trafficking model. Criminal networks have diversified their revenue streams into illegal mining, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and extortion schemes such as the so-called “gota a gota” loansharking system. This diversification allows them to finance operations, control territory, and penetrate local economies. The result is a transnational criminal ecosystem that ignores administrative borders.

 

The December 12 meeting between the presidents of Peru and Ecuador in Quito must be read through this lens. Ecuador speaks from hard-earned experience: armed gangs, ports under criminal influence, and prisons turned into power centers. Peru—particularly its northern regions—still has a window of opportunity to avoid a similar scenario, but only if it acknowledges that the threat is already shared.

 

At the same time, the presence of FBI and DEA delegations in Lima signals a meaningful shift. The United States is no longer waiting for institutional collapse before engaging, as it has in other cases. Instead, it is pursuing strategic prevention, built on intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and political alignment. In that context, the potential designation of Peru as a Major Non-NATO Ally is not merely symbolic; it would formalize deeper military and security cooperation.

 

An additional, uncomfortable layer cannot be ignored: electoral politics. Peru is heading into presidential and congressional elections, and Bloomberg has reported that the Trump administration has openly pressured countries undergoing electoral processes to align with its agenda, conditioning support and withdrawing traditional cooperation mechanisms such as USAID. There is no public evidence of direct electoral intervention, but there is a clear reconfiguration of the political environment, where hard security policies and international alignment gain prominence over social agendas.

 

This pattern bears resemblance—albeit with important differences—to dynamics not seen since the Cold War. The tools are no longer coups or overt interference, but indirect pressure, selective cooperation, and plausible deniability. The adversary is no longer ideological, but criminal; the logic of alignment, however, remains.

 

For Piura, this is not an abstract debate. As a border region with Ecuador, a commercial hub with ports and road networks, and an area where extortion and illicit economies are expanding, Piura stands at the frontline of this strategic shift. Increased international cooperation may bring stronger state presence and enforcement, but it also carries the risk of overly punitive responses if not paired with economic development and institutional strengthening.

 

The core question is no longer whether geopolitics reaches Piura. It already has. The real issue is whether Piura will remain merely a stage where externally designed strategies are applied—or whether it can become a conscious territorial actor, capable of demanding that security be built not only through operations, but through development, governance, and sustainable territorial control.