The Latin-American Legacy of Tambograndé

I joined a webinar on March 16^th, 2022. It was summoned by Beyond 2020 Solidarity and Acción No Violenta en las Americas. It was a chance to share experiences about how non-violence can prevent or stop natural resources extraction. Other panelists were in Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, and Ecuador. Coming next, I transcript my exposition.

 

Tambograndé is located in Piura, Northwestern Peru. It’s mostly dedicated to exporting agriculture. It forms San Lorenzo Valley, a Peruvian government’s project established 1950.

It’s surrounded by the equatorial Dry Forest, a very sensitive endemic ecosystem that provides other economic activity – cattle. It also allows apiculture or little food industry. Algarrobina or carob syrup is one of the most famous natural food supplements in Peru. Water comes here from Piura River, quiet from fall to spring, huge in summer.

 

The conflict

Tambograndé’s people  opposed to a proposed mine that was going to be operated by former Vancouver-based Manhattan Minerals Corporation, (Manhattan).  Farmers feared it might pollute San Lorenzo Valley, the dry forest, and Piura River.

Pollution might affect negatively the mango exportation. San Lorenzo can sell abroad until 300,000 tons in a good season. United States, Canada, and Europe are the most important markets. Peru is the third main mango exporter in the world.

The other hazard was going to be Piura River’s pollution. During el Niño events, heavy rains can overload it, becoming destructive. On March 22^nd, 2017, it flooded Piura Downtown, the regional capital city.

Fight in San Lorenzo Valley began in October 1999. People at the croplands discovered Manhattan was drilling the soil to get mineral tests. The problem was it didn’t ask the people for an authorization to enter. San Lorenzo valley is basically private property established 1960.

People demanded the national and local government to rule Manhattan. They had no answer. Then, people demanded Manhattan to leave the town. It couldn’t because it had much to lose. All its money was invested in three poly-metallic deposits:

• B5, amid the nearby dry forest.
• TG3, just beside Piura River across Tambograndé Downtown.
• TG1, just underneath Tambograndé Downtown.

This last one was the most critical because it demanded to move about 20,000 people. Underneath Tambograndé Downtown, it lays a deposit of gold, silver, cooper, zinc, and iron. The problem was Manhattan didn’t guarantee a clean operation to San Lorenzo farmers

When activists translated Manhattan’s info from its website, they discovered the company was probably cheating. This was the first reason why San Lorenzo’s people didn’t want it. You cannot build good relationships about anything if you lie – a deal was not possible.

As the government didn’t support Tambograndé’s demand, people decided to protest. Demonstrations were raising each time. On February 27^th to 28^th, 2001, Tambograndé went to a general strike. There were struggles between farmers and the Police in Manhattan’s camp at Tambograndé Uptown. Amid the protest, the facility was destroyed and burned.

But the real plot point came one month later. On March 31^st, 2001, a killer gunshot San Lorenzo’s leader Godofredo Garcia. The farmer, an agricultural engineer and professor, died bleeding.

 

The non-violent solution

After Godofredo Garcia’s murder, Tambograndé issued a pacific strategy, a multi-strategy actually.

Organizational: Tambograndé and San Lorenzo already revived its Front of Defense, a civil organization created to fight a former enemy, French mining company BRGM. In 1970s, it was to exploit iron deposits next to Tambograndé Downtown.

The Front of Defense had already an ally, Diacony for Justice and Peace, a human rights office managed by the Catholic Church, that connected to other non-profit organizations across Peru. They formed the Mesa Técnica, the Technical Panel. It linked other organizations and individuals around the world. The local cause of Tambograndé became global.

 

Educational: The Front of Defense and the Technical Panel summoned many workshops and seminars. Their goal was to inform and to educate the people about benefits and risks of having a mine amid an agricultural valley . They happened in Tambograndé City as well as the countryside.

The Front of Defense leaders also went to town halls and even Peru’s Congress. The presentations were based upon science. In 2001 and 2003, American scientist Robert Moran conducted a field research. The hydro-geologist and geo-chemistrian gave reasons instead of slogans.

In 2003, the time for Tambograndé was getting over. Manhattan had to present its environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). A government agency, a recognized private university, and even a volunteer chemistrian reviewed the document. They all found more than a hundred errors and mistakes.

 

Legal: In June 2^nd, 2002, 7 of every 10 voters freely attended to a popular consultation.

People were asked if they agreed or disagreed the mining activity in Tambograndé and San Lorenzo Valley. Nine of every ten said no. Peru’s Government never recognized it as legal. However, it was a Latin American milestone.

Further popular consultations were applied in Esquel, Argentina, Sipacapa, Guatemala, and even Piura Highlands, Peru. All cases resulted the majority opposed to local mining projects. They all were inspired on Tambograndé.

 

Political: In 2003, Front of Defense ran Francisco Ojeda for Tambograndé’s Mayor. He wan. The purpose was to shut down the Manhattan’s project but from inside the government.

 

Cultural: The ultimate Tambograndé’s demonstration was November 4^th to 6^th, 2003. Manhattan needed to present its EIA in public hearings. It was a Peruvian government’s requirement to pass from exploration to exploitation. Manhattan only needed to have two of three hearings.

Tambograndé and its allies organized a boycott, but it was a big cultural event. The star was the mango and his buddy, the lime. Manhattan couldn’t do any hearing.

After the last one cancelled, its share in Toronto Stock Exchange brought down 40%. After failed trials, it left Peru mid-2005.

 

Media: The Technical Panel sponsored three books and a newspaper insert. As Manhattan had a website, the fight also moved to the cloud. In October 2000, I launched FACTORTIERRA. In 2001, Technical Panel launched tambogrande.org.pe

In 2007, an emblematic documentary was premiered. Ernesto Cabellos & Stephanie Boyd’s Tambograndé– Mangos, Mining, Murder was awarded around the world. Even, it was broadcast. Other reports were featured on Peruvian TV as well as international. BBC released a multi-platform story in December 2003.

Even a music CD featuring late Somos Tambograndé duo was released too.

 

What we learned

• First, the Tambograndé’s very well coordinated multi-strategy worked terrific. The starting point was its identity, what makes it unique in the world.
• Second, Thinking in long term. Solving the conflict was the first goal. What about the future? Sustainable development has answers. For example, we see Tambograndé as an experiential tourism hotspot. It’s about archeology, ecology, healthy lifestyle, eco businesses. Even in my opinion, a good location for photography, video, and film. Come here, and try it by yourself.
• About this particular, third, a personal reflection: when you use the media for real positive purposes, you can change the course of history. I’m the living proof that it is really possible.

Search the #5 F T peru for more insights about this. Photos featured in this entry are Arturo Peñaherrera. Watch the full webinar here: https://lnkd.in/eUP-xMN8